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FIRST AMENDMENT BATTLES OVER ANTIDEPLATFORMING STATUTES: EXAMINING
MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING CO. V. TORNILLO' S
RELEVANCE FOR TODAY'S ONLINE SOCIAL
MEDIA PLATFORM CASES
CLAY CALVERT*

Floridaadopted a statute in 2021 barringlarge social media sites from deplatformingremovingfrom their sites-candidatesrunningfor state andlocal office. Soon thereafter,
Texas adopted its own anti-deplatforming statute. A trade association representing

several major social media companies is now challenging the laws in federal courtfor
violating the platforms' First Amendment speech rights. A central issue in both
NetChoice, LLC v. Moody (targetingFlorida's statute) and NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton
(attackingTexas's law) is the significance of the U.S. Supreme Court's 1974 decision in
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo. In Tornillo, the Court struck down a Florida
statute that compelled print newspapers thatpublished attacks on political candidates'
character or record to provide access in their pages for those political candidates'

replies. This Article examines the relevance of Tornillo's agingprecedent in conferring
print newspapers with a right of editorial autonomy and a right not to be compelled to
speak in today's social media, anti-deplatforming cases. The Article avers that while
Tornillo may help the platforms with their legal challenges, its impact is cabined by
several crucialfactual and legal distinctions. The Article concludes that dicta regarding
both access and social media platforms in the U.S. Supreme Court's 2017 decision in
Packingham v. North Carolina could play a surprisingrole in pushing back against

Tornillo.
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INTRODUCTION

In June 2021, a federal district court blocked Florida's enforcement of
a statute that prohibits prominent social media sites from deplatforming
candidates running for state and local office. 1 Deplatforming is defined as
"the action or practice by a social media platform to permanently delete or
ban a user or to temporarily delete or ban a user from the social media
platform for more than 14 days." 2 The statute targets what Florida Governor
Ron DeSantis called "big tech oligarchs" that act as a "council of censors." 3
DeSantis, a possible Republican contender for President of the United States
in 2024, proclaimed earlier in 2021 that "we cannot allow Big Tech to
interfere in our elections by putting a thumb on the scale for political
candidates favored by Silicon Valley." 4
In issuing a preliminary injunction, however, U.S. District Court Judge
Robert Hinkle reasoned in NetChoice, LLC v. Moody that the antideplatforming statute, which is part of a cluster of Florida laws targeting
social media sites, was preempted by a federal statute. 5 Judge Hinkle thus
did not need, for the disposition of the case, to address whether the antideplatforming mandate, which applies only to large and fiscally robust
platforms, 6 violates the platforms' First Amendment free speech rights.7

I NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, No. 4:21cv220-RH-MAF, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121951 (N.D.
Fla. June 30, 2021). The statute provides, in key part, that "[a] social media platform may not
willfully deplatform a candidate for office who is known by the social media platform to be a
candidate, beginning on the date of qualification and ending on the date of the election or the date
the candidate ceases to be a candidate." FLA. STAT. § 106.072(2) (2021).
2 FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(c) (2021).
3 Ana Ceballos, Colleen Wright & Kirby Wilson, DeSantis Signs Bill to Crack Down on 'Big
Tech,' MIAMI HERALD, May 25, 2021, at lA.
4 Ana Ceballos, Kirby Wilson & Lawrence Mower, DeSantis Adds Conservative Flair to
'State of the State'Address as He Kicks OffLegislature, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 3, 2021, at lA; see,
e.g., Editorial, Judge Says Republicans MisinterpretedAnti-Riot Law. Really?, MIAMI HERALD,
Sept. 14, 2021, at 10A (calling DeSantis "a potential 2024 presidential contender").
5 See NetChoice, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121951, at *19-20 (finding that the antideplatforming statute was inconsistent with 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) and thus was preempted by 47
U.S.C. § 230(e)(3)); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (prohibiting the imposition of civil liability on
interactive computer services when, acting in good faith, they "restrict access to or availability of
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable"); 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (providing, in pertinent part,
that "no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section").
6 The law only affects platforms that have either "annual gross revenues in excess of $100
million" or "at least 100 million monthly individual platform participants globally." FLA. STAT. §

501.2041(1)(g)(4)(a)-(b) (2021).
7 The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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The case now is pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. 8 In their opening brief filed in September 2021, Florida
Attorney General Ashley Brooke Moody and the other Florida defendants
argued that the law is not preempted by a federal statute, 9 and, moreover, that
it passes muster under the First Amendment.10 A key aspect of any First
Amendment analysis before the Eleventh Circuit-and in front of the U.S.
Supreme Court, if the politically charged case reaches that far-will be the
relevance of the Supreme Court's 1974 ruling in Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo.11 Indeed, NetChoice, a trade association that counts
Facebook and Twitter among its members, leaned heavily on Tornillo at the
district court level. 12 Conversely, the Florida defendants have attempted to
factually distinguish Tornillo and diminish its significance in their opening
brief with the Eleventh Circuit. 13
In Tornillo, the Court struck down on First Amendment grounds a
Florida statute that compelled print newspapers to provide candidates
running for office with free and equally conspicuous space to reply to those
newspapers' attacks on their character or official record.14 This right-of-reply
statute amounted to what the Court variously called a "right-of-access

The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated nearly 100 years ago through the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties applicable for governing the
actions of state and local government entities and officials. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925).
8 NetChoice, LLC v. Att'y Gen., No. 21-12355 (11th Cir. filed Sept. 7, 2021). In response,
Appellees, NetChoice, LLC, filed a reply brief on November 8, 2021. Reply Brief, NetChoice, LLC,

No. 21-12355 (11th Cir. filed Nov. 8, 2021).
9 See Opening Brief of Appellants at 8, NetChoice, LLC, No. 21-12355 (11th Cir. filed Sept.
7, 2021) [hereinafter Opening Brief of Appellants] ("Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits
of their claim that any provision of the Act is facially preempted by 47 U.S.C. § 230.").
10 See id. at 2 ("Florida's law is consistent with Section 230 as well as the FirstAmendment,
and the injunction should be reversed.") (emphasis added).
11 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
12 See NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, No. 4:21cv220-RH-MAF, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121951,
at *24 (N.D. Fla. June 30, 2021) ("The plaintiffs push hardest of [sic] Tornillo, which ... held
unconstitutional the Florida statute requiring a newspaper to allow a candidate to reply to the
newspaper's unfavorable statements."). NetChoice describes itself as "a trade association of
businesses who share the goal of promoting free speech and free enterprise on the net." Media Hits
and
Press Statements,
NETCHOICE,
https://netchoice.org/media-hits-press-statements
[https://perma.cc/J64T-7BFL] (last visited Feb. 16, 2022). Among its members are Facebook,
Google, TikTok, Twitter, and Yahoo!. About Us, NETCHOICE, https://netchoice.org/about
[https://perma.cc/M473 -H8C6] (last visited Feb. 16, 2022).
13 See Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 9, at 24 (noting NetChoice's reliance on
Tornillo, but contending that "in key respects, newspapers are unlike social media platforms
making decisions about which users to deplatform, censor, or shadow ban").
14 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 244 (observing that Florida's right-of-reply statute "provides that if a
candidate for nomination or election is assailed regarding his personal character or official record
by any newspaper, the candidate has the right to demand that the newspaper print, free of cost to
the candidate, any reply the candidate may make to the newspaper's charges").

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4

[vol. 97:1

&

statute"15 and "a compulsory access law." 16 In other words, print newspapers
in Florida were forced to host and disseminate the expressive content of
political candidates if they criticized them.
Florida's new anti-deplatforming law is similar. Because the law bars
large social media platforms from permanently deleting candidates'
accounts, the platforms are compelled to host those individuals and to
provide them with access to a digital venue from which they can widely
disseminate their ideologies and opinions.? In short, the laws at issue in both
Tornillo and NetChoice compel media entities-print newspapers in
Tornillo, online platforms in NetChoice-to accommodate the speech of
politicians.
This Article examines the relevance of Tornillo in cases such as
NetChoice. Importantly, it is not the only legal battle in which Tornillo likely
will play a pivotal role. To wit, NetChoice also sued Texas in September
2021 after the Lone Star State followed in Florida's footsteps and adopted a
similar, but not identical, statute that bans social media platforms from
censoring and deplatforming users based on their viewpoints.18 Tornillo is
front and center in NetChoice's complaint against Texas, appearing as the
first case cited on the first page of its complaint. 19 NetChoice cites Tornillo
to support the proposition that it and its fellow plaintiff, the Computer
Communications Industry Association, "are . . . trade associations whose
members have First Amendment rights to engage in their own speech and to
exercise editorial discretion over the speech published on their websites and
applications. "20
Part I of this Article provides a primer on Tornillo and, in particular, its
rejection of a compelled-access mandate in the print medium. 21 Part II
illustrates and evaluates two related ways in which Tornillo might carry
15
16

Id. at 257.
Id. at 258.
17 See FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(c) (2021) ("'Deplatform' means the action or practice by a
social media platform to permanently delete or ban a user or to temporarily delete or ban a user
from the social media platform for more than 14 days.").
18 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 23-24, NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton,
No. 1:21-CV-840-RP, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233460 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2021) [hereinafter
Complaint Against
Paxton],
https://netchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/1-main.pdf
[https://perma.cc/229U-EDKR] (describing the relevant portions of the Texas statutes at issue in
the case); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 120 (West 2021); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 143A.001-008 (West 2021). On December 1, 2022, the Court released an opinion granting
NetChoice's preliminary injunction. NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, No. 1:21-CV-840-RP (W.D. Tex.
Dec. 1, 2021). In March 2022, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton appealed the district court's
decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing, among other things, that
"Tornillo is inapposite right from the start" when compared to Texas's statute. Brief for Appellant
at 20, NetChoice LLC v. Paxton, No. 21-51178 (5th Cir. filed Mar. 2, 2022).
19 Complaint Against Paxton, supra note 18, at 1.
20 Id.
21 Infra notes 26-45 and accompanying text.
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significance in lawsuits challenging anti-deplatforming statutes: 1)
safeguarding the editorial independence and discretion of social media
platforms, and 2) protecting the unenumerated First Amendment right not to
be compelled to speak. 22 Part III contends that the Supreme Court's failure
in Tornillo to even mention, much less to apply sub silentio, the strict
scrutiny standard of review to a blatantly content-based law is problematic. 23
The Court's approach sows doubts about whether Tornillo provides an
impenetrable barrier against government intervention in online marketplaces
of ideas or whether it merely affords a First Amendment interest that can be
weighed and balanced against competing governmental concerns. Finally,
Part IV concludes that Justice Anthony Kennedy's dicta in Packingham v.
North Carolina24 regarding access to internet fora will provide courts with a
legal wildcard--a decision the importance, value, and relevance of which are
difficult to predict--to play against Tornillo and in favor of state
governments' anti-deplatforming mandates.2 s

I
A PRIMER ON TORNILLO

Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo pitted the government's
ability to intervene in the print marketplace of ideas against a newspaper's
First Amendment right of press freedom to control the content that appears
in its publication. 26 The image of an unfettered, laissez-faire marketplace of
ideas that allows the airing of all views and that helps society discover and
test competing conceptions of the truth has permeated First Amendment
jurisprudence since Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.'s famed 1919 dissent
in Abrams v. United States.27 The Florida law's supporters in Tornillo,

22
23

Infra notes 46-72 and accompanying text.

Infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.

24

137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
Infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254 (1974) (highlighting the
"confrontation" between "an enforceable right of access" via "governmental coercion," on the one
hand, and "the express provisions of the First Amendment and the judicial gloss on that Amendment
developed over the years," on the other).
27 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas that the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market .... "); see also RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992) ("The marketplace image is grounded in
laissez-faire economic theory."); Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Missing Marketplace ofIdeas Theory,
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1725, 1728 (2019) (asserting that "[t]he marketplace of ideas theory has
played a dominant role in the Court's free speech jurisprudence"); Jared Schroeder, Shifting the
25
26

Metaphor: Examining Discursive Influences on the Supreme Court's Use of the Marketplace
Metaphor in Twenty-First-Century Free Expression Cases, 21 COMMC'N L. & POL'Y 383, 384

(2016) (noting that "the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor was first utilized by the Court in Justice

Oliver Wendell Holmes's spirited dissent inAbrams v. United States").
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however, were concerned about the concentration of newspaper ownership
that allegedly gave a few dominant businesses immense power in the
marketplace of ideas to shape public opinion and jeopardized the public's
ability to be informed of all viewpoints. 28 These proponents perceived the
newspaper marketplace of ideas as being skewed in favor of the entities that
owned it and the views those entities chose to publish-a situation that
imperiled "[t]he First Amendment interest ofthe public in being informed." 29
Conversely, the Miami Herald contended that the compelled-access mandate
violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. 30
Pat Tornillo, a candidate for the Florida legislature, sought declaratory
and injunctive relief when he was refused access by the Miami Herald to its
pages after the newspaper published editorials attacking him. 31 Tornillo was
represented by Professor Jerome Barron, 32 who had penned an extremely
significant law review article less than a decade before advocating for a First
Amendment-grounded right of access to print newspapers. 33 In that article,
Barron criticized the "romantic conception" of a "freely accessible"
marketplace of ideas. 34 He averred that "[t]he mass media's development of
an antipathy to ideas requires legal intervention if novel and unpopular ideas
are to be assured a forum." 35 In turn, Barron contended that "our
constitutional law authorizes a carefully framed right of access statute which
would forbid an arbitrary denial of space, hence securing an effective forum
for the expression of divergent opinions." 36 Ultimately, his "proposal for a
speakers' right of access to the media .. .sparked decades of debate." 37
In Tornillo, however, the Supreme Court ruled that Barron's compelledaccess arguments, while perhaps legitimate, 38 were nonetheless outweighed
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 248-54.
Id. at 251.
Id. at 245.
31 Id. at 243-44; see L.A. Powe, Jr., Scholarship and Markets, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 172,
178 (1987) ("When Pat Tornillo was running for District 103 of the Florida House of
Representatives, the Miami Herald savaged him in a pair of pre-election editorials. He demanded
and was refused his statutory right of reply.").
32 Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Media-A ContemporaryAppraisal, 35 HOFSTRAL. REV.
937, 940-41 (2007).
33 Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641 (1967); see Samantha Barbas, Creatingthe PublicForum, 44 AKRON L. REV. 809, 812 n.15
(2011) (calling Barron's article "pathbreaking"); Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy and Free
Speech: The FirstAmendment at War With Itself, 35 HOFSTRAL. REV. 1211, 1211 (2007) (dubbing
Barron's article a "watershed" piece of scholarship).
34 Barron, supra note 33, at 1641.
28
29
30

35

Id.

36 Id. at 1678.
37 Neil Weinstock Netanel, New Media in OldBottles? Barron's ContextualFirstAmendment
and Copyright in the DigitalAge, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 952, 954 (2008).
38 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 53 (1991) (noting that "[t]he text and
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by First Amendment concerns. 39 In striking down Florida's statute and thus
ruling against Pat Tornillo, the Court was concerned with at least three items.
One was the self-censorship in which newspapers might engage in order to
avoid the application of the right-of-reply statute.40 Such a chilling effect on
the press would actually harm the marketplace of ideas, the Court reasoned,
because a newspaper would not print its own viewpoint about a candidate in
order to avoid being compelled to print that candidate's opinion in reply.4 1 A
second concern was the cost-both financial and spatial-imposed by the
Florida statute on print newspapers. 42 In short, the Court was concerned that
a newspaper would either need to jettison some of its own content to make
space for a candidate's reply or add more pages if it wanted to keep its own
content and to comply with the law. 43 Third, the Court was disturbed by the
statute's intrusion on the editorial autonomy and independent judgment of
newspaper editors, reasoning that:
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as
to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public
issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the
exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated
how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised
consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have
evolved to this time.44

.

footnotes of the Court's opinion are sprinkled with data about the twin phenomena of increasing
chain ownership and one-newspaper cities"); Angela J. Campbell, A HistoricalPerspective on the
Public's Right of Access to the Media, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1027, 1079 (2007) (describing the
Court's "lengthy and sympathetic discussion of the arguments for the public's right of access").
39 See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254 (1974) ("[T]he implementation
of a remedy such as an enforceable right of access necessarily calls for some mechanism, either
governmental or consensual. If it is governmental coercion, this . . . brings about a confrontation
with the express provisions of the First Amendment and the judicial gloss on that Amendment ..
.").
40 The Court reasoned that when "[f]aced with the penalties that would accrue to any
newspaper that published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the right-of-access
statute, editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy." Id. at 257. The
Court thus concluded that "under the operation of the Florida statute, political and electoral
coverage would be blunted or reduced." Id.
41 In other words, instead of the public receiving two viewpoints under the law a newspaper's
viewpoint about a candidate and a candidate's viewpoint in rebuttal the public would receive
neither viewpoint because a newspaper would simply not publish its own editorial opining about a
candidate.
42 The Court elaborated here that "the penalty resulting from the compelled printing of a reply
is exacted in terms of the cost in printing and composing time and materials and in taking up space
that could be devoted to other material the newspaper may have preferred to print." Tornillo, 418
U.S. at 256.
43 See Nat Stern, The Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 847,
864 (2011) ("An obligatory published reply would either heap additional costs on a newspaper or
detract from other material that it intended to publish.").
44 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
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Put differently, editing is for editors, not the government, and ensuring
fairness in a newspaper's pages is simply not the government's prerogative.4
With this encapsulation of Tornillo in mind, the next Part examines two
critical ways in which the nearly fifty-year-old ruling may prove influential
today in social media, anti-deplatforming battles such as NetChoice, LLC v.
Moody and NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton.
II
THE INTEREST OF EDITORIAL AUTONOMY AND THE RIGHT NOT TO BE
COMPELLED TO SPEAK

A threshold fact that could affect Tornillo's relevance for today's online
social media cases is that Tornillo involved the print medium while
NetChoice's cases against the anti-deplatforming laws in Florida and Texas
implicate internet media. Might the distinctions between these forms of
media make a difference? Probably not. That is because the Supreme Court
made it clear in 1997 that speakers on the internet are entitled to full First
Amendment protection. 46 The problem of spectrum scarcity and the long
history of extensive regulation that allow the government to more easily
regulate speech on the over-the-air broadcast medium "are not present in
cyberspace."47
If the difference in medium thus does not diminish Tornillo's relevance
for analyzing the constitutionality of anti-deplatforming statutes, then
Tornillo may be especially important on two issues: the scope of First
Amendment protection for the editorial control and autonomy of social
media platforms and the First Amendment right of such platforms not to be
compelled to speak. These issues are addressed separately below.
A.

EditorialControl andAutonomy

Tornillo's concern with editorial control and autonomy at first blush
seemingly provides a powerful weapon in the arsenal of social media
platforms against the constitutionality of anti-deplatforming laws. As
described above, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Florida's compelled-

4s Jerome A. Barron, On Understandingthe FirstAmendment Status of Cable: Some Obstacles
in the Way, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1495, 1499 (1989) (asserting that the Supreme Court's theme
in its Tornillo decision "is editorial autonomy: the right of editors to decide, without judicial
oversight, what they will print and what they will not").
46 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (agreeing with the district court's conclusion
that "our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should
be applied to this medium").
47 Id. at 868; see Charles D. Ferris & Terrence J. Leahy, Red Lions, Tigers and Bears:
Broadcast Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 299, 309 (1989)
(defining spectrum scarcity as "the shortage of electromagnetic frequencies available for public

use").
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access law partly because the statute intruded on the editorial control,
judgment, and autonomy of newspaper editors. 48 The operators of social
media platforms can similarly be viewed as making editorial choices about
what speech they will allow on their sites when they create and enforce
content-based terms of service. For example, Facebook bans hate speech,
which it defined in late November 2021 "as a direct attack against peoplerather than concepts or institutions-on the basis of what we call protected
characteristics: race, ethnicity, national origin, disability, religious
affiliation, caste, sexual orientation, sex, gender identity and serious
disease." 49 That same month, Twitter had a policy that users were not
allowed to "glorify, celebrate, praise or condone violent crimes, violent
events where people were targeted because of their membership in a
protected group, or the perpetrators of such acts."5 0 As a result, Twitter will
deplatform-i.e., permanently suspend-someone who violates this policy
after an initial warning.51 Deplatforming therefore amounts to a tool by
which a social media platform can enforce its editorial choices about
permissible content. When Florida bars large social media platforms from
deplatforming political candidates, it strips those platforms of a mechanism
to punish candidates who violate their editorial policies. The platforms are
compelled to give enduring access to candidates who breach their boundaries
of permissible content.
Yet, the editorial choices made by newspaper editors differ from those
made by the operators of social media platforms. Indeed, Judge Hinkle noted
this fact in NetChoice, LLC v. Moody. "[N]ewspapers, unlike socialmedia
[sic] providers, create or select all their content, including op-eds and letters
to the editor. Nothing makes it into the paper without substantive,
discretionary review, including for content and viewpoint; a newspaper is
not a medium invisible to the provider." 52 In contrast, Judge Hinkle observed
social media platforms "routinely use algorithms to screen all content for
unacceptable material but usually not for viewpoint, and the overwhelming

48 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's concern with editorial
control and autonomy).
49

Hate

Speech,

META:

FACEBOOK

CMTY.

STANDARDS,

https://transparency.tb.com/policies/community-standards/hate-speech
[https://perma.cc/68WFGFRR].
so Glorification of Violence Policy, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-andpolicies/glorification-of-violence [https://perma.cc/7UD8-BK2F].
s See id. ("The first time you violate this policy, we will require you to remove this content.
We will also temporarily lock you out of your account before you can Tweet again. If you continue
to violate this policy after receiving a warning, your account will be permanently suspended.").

52 NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, No. 4:21cv220-RH-MAF, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121951, at
*24-25 (N.D. Fla. June 30, 2021) (responding to the plaintiffs' editorial autonomy arguments
against the Florida anti-deplatforming law under Tornillo and other Supreme Court precedents).
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majority of the material never gets reviewed except by algorithms."5 3 In
brief, print newspapers seemingly exercise greater editorial control because
they actively select all ofthe content that appears in their pages. Social media
platforms, by contrast, do not actively select the content that appears on their
sites; rather, they enforce terms of service that are used to remove
objectionable content once it is posted. In other words, there is a crucial
difference between selectionfor inclusion (what newspaper editors do) and
selection for removal (what social media platforms do). This distinction
might weaken Tornillo's pushback against anti-deplatforming laws.
Another major weakness in applying Tornillo's editorial autonomy
principle to anti-deplatforming statutes is that the Supreme Court in Tornillo
explicitly linked that principle to the First Amendment's guarantee of afree
press rather than tethering it to that amendment's protection offree speech.54
This went unaddressed in Judge Hinkle's opinion in NetChoice, LLC v.
Moody. The Court in Tornillo was unmistakably concerned with protecting
the press from government interference with its judgment about content,
stating that "[a] responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press
responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other
virtues it cannot be legislated." 5 5 As Professor David Anderson explains, the
Court in Tornillo "seems to recognize a distinct right of editorial autonomy
arising from the Press Clause." 6
The obvious problem for social media platforms such as Twitter and
Facebook is that courts may not consider them to be members of the press.
They may not merit special, institutional-speaker protection under the Press
Clause simply because their primary role is arguably not to play a journalistic
watchdog role on the government or to inform listeners about news. 57 Twitter
and Facebook clearly engage in the speech business and merit protection

Id. at *24.
54 See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) ("The choice of material
to go into a newspaper ... constitute[s] the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to
be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent
with First Amendment guarantees of a free press .... ").
55 Id. at 256.
56 David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 494 (2002).
53

57

See

RonNell

Andersen Jones, Press Speakers and the FirstAmendmentfRights ofListeners,

90 U. COLO. L. REV. 499, 548 (2019) (contending that acknowledgment of "the press as a special
institutional speaker is an important starting point for analysis of the Press Clause, which should
be read to give members of the institutional press both broad editorial discretion over their decisions
in curating the institution's news product and broad newsgathering rights in creating it"); Sonja R.
West, The "Press," Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49, 105 (2016) (suggesting that protection of
the press under the Press Clause "was inextricably linked with a group of specialists who were
discharging a particular set of functions by informing the citizenry about matters of public concern
and checking government abuses").
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under the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. 58
Whether they are members of the press within the meaning of the Press
Clause as it was invoked in Tornillo is a very different matter. Courts in
social media, anti-deplatforming cases may choose to read Tornillonarrowly
as a Press Clause case about protecting journalists who play a checking-value
function in exposing government abuses of power. 59 If they do so, this would
reduce, if not eviscerate, the usefulness of social media platforms citing
Tornillo's concerns with editorial autonomy to challenge such laws.
B.

The Right Not to Be Compelled to Speak

Even if Tornillo is narrowly construed as a Press Clause case with little
or no bearing when it comes to protecting the editorial autonomy of social
media platforms, the case still carries weight for those platforms as a rightnot-to-speak case. 60 In brief, the First Amendment protects not only the right
to speak freely, but also the right not be compelled by the government to
speak. 61
The Supreme Court in 1988 observed that Tornillo established "[t]he
constitutional equivalence of compelled speech and compelled silence in the
context of fully protected expression." 62 In 2006, it cited Tornillo as one of
several "compelled-speech cases" in which the Court "limited the
government's ability to force one speaker to host or accommodate another
speaker's message." 63 Still more recently, the Court suggested that
compelling speech actually may be more harmful than-not simply

58 The term "speech business" has been used by the U.S. Supreme Court to refer to a business
whose primary good or service is speech. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 560, 566
(1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (referring to a "book and film business" that sold and displayed
sexually explicit content as "a speech business"). By way of contrast, "shopping centers aren't
usually in the speech business." Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech in Cyberspace from the
Listener'sPerspective: PrivateSpeech Restrictions, Libel, StateAction, Harassment, andSex, 1996

U. CHI. LEGAL F. 377, 389 (1996).
59

See LUCAS A. POWE,

JR., THE FOURTH

ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE

PRESS IN AMERICA 261 (1991) (asserting that the decision in Tornillo "guaranteed the press the
necessary autonomy to perform the checking function"); see also Vincent Blasi, The Checking
Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM. BAR. FOUND. RSCH. J. 521, 527 (1997) (identifying
the First Amendment-based "value that free speech, a free press, and free assembly can serve in
checking the abuse of power by public officials").
60 The right of editorial autonomy and the right not to be compelled to speak overlap, but they
are not coextensive. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Do Platforms Have Editorial Rights?, 1 J. FREE
SPEECH L. 97, 99-100 (2021) (addressing the differences between editorial rights and the right not
to be compelled to speak).
61 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (noting that "the right of freedom of
thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all").
62 Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988).
63 Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 63 (2006).
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equivalent to-silencing it.64
Tornillo was a compelled-speech case because Florida newspapers
were forced to convey content penned by candidates who they attacked in
their editorials. 65 Similarly, social media, anti-deplatforming cases such as
NetChoice, LLC v. Moody are compelled-speech cases: The platforms are
compelled to host and accommodate other speakers' messages because they
cannot delete those speakers' accounts. Although the Florida statute does not
bar a platform from removing a candidate's content that violates its terms of
service, a platform seemingly is compelled to host and convey all other
content that a candidate posts. 66 Indeed, another Florida statute related to the
anti-deplatforming measure bars social media platforms from "apply[ing] or
us[ing] post-prioritization or shadow banning algorithms for content and
material posted by or about a user who is known by the social media platform
to be a candidate."67
There is, however, an important distinction between the compelledspeech obligation in Tornillo and the one imposed by Florida's antideplatforming statute. Specifically, the compelled-speech mandate in
Tornillo came into play only when a newspaper criticized a candidate's
character or record; in other words, newspapers were penalized-forced to
carry content against their wishes-only because they expressed their own
political views. 68 The right-of-reply statute at issue in Tornillo thus amounted
to what Professor Eugene Volokh aptly calls a content-triggered
compulsion. 69
64 See Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464
(2018) ("When speech is compelled, however, additional damage is done. In that situation,
individuals are coerced into betraying their convictions. Forcing free and independent individuals
to endorse ideas they find objectionable is always demeaning .... ").
65 Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (noting that "[c]ompelling
editors or publishers to publish . . .is what is at issue in this case").
66 The Florida defendants contend in their opening brief filed with the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals that "nothing in the Act prohibits platforms from censoring candidates; platforms are
only restricted in their ability to deplatform candidates." Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note
9, at 33.
67 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.2041(2)(h) (West 2021). The statute defines post-prioritization as
"action by a social media platform to place, feature, or prioritize certain content or material ahead
of, below, or in a more or less prominent position than others in a newsfeed, a feed, a view, or in
search results." Id. § 501.2041(1)(e). It defines shadow banning as "action by a social media
platform, through any means, whether the action is determined by a natural person or an algorithm,
to limit or eliminate the exposure of a user or content or material posted by a user to other users of
the social media platform." Id. § 501.2041(1)(f).
68 See Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEx. L. REV. 355, 360 (2018)
(addressing the law at issue in Tornillo as "presumptively unconstitutional" because, in part,
"compelling speakers who say something to also carry other speech . . impos[es] a form of tax on
certain kinds of speech").
69 Id.; see also Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, Toward aMore Explicit, Independent,
Consistent and Nuanced Compelled Speech Doctrine, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 18 (2020)
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In contrast, the anti-deplatforming statute in NetChoice, LLC v. Moody
is not triggered by any specific content that a social media platform hosts or
conveys. A court that focuses on this distinction from Tornillo thus might
view the compelled-speech obligation in NetChoice, LLC v. Moody as less
problematic. It might, in turn, perceive the statute as more akin to the one at
issue in Turner BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC.70 The statute in that case
compelled cable system operators, regardless of their own content, to carry
the content of over-the-air broadcast stations. 71 The Court in Turner found
that these must-carry provisions were constitutional, declaring that they "do
not pose such inherent dangers to free expression, or present such potential
for censorship or manipulation, as to justify application of the most exacting
level of First Amendment scrutiny." 2
In sum, using Tornillo to attack anti-deplatforming statutes either on the
ground that they interfere with editorial autonomy or that they compel speech
has both strengths and weaknesses. Judges in the anti-deplatforming cases
will have leeway in terms of how much weight they afford Tornillo. A judge
with strong, pro-First Amendment proclivities certainly could use Tornillo
to strike down an anti-deplatforming statute such as that at issue in
NetChoice. In contrast, a judge who is more concerned with political
candidates having access to popular social media platforms so that they can
disseminate their views to the public has the opportunity to distinguish
Tornillo.
III
TORNILLO'S ABSENT STRICT SCRUTINY ANALYSIS

In today's First Amendment jurisprudence, content-based statutes
generally are subject to review under the strict scrutiny test.73 Tornillo
involved a content-based statute because it compelled newspapers to print a
specific type of subject matter-namely, the responses of candidates to

(identifying Tornillo as "just such a case" in which "[t]he trigger for the compelled speech is prior
private speech").
70 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
71 Id. at 643-44. As Justice Anthony Kennedy explained in Turner, the FCC's "must-carry
rules, on their face, impose burdens and conferbenefits without reference to the content of speech."
Id. at 643. He added that while "the provisions interfere with cable operators' editorial discretion
by compelling them to offer carriage to a certain minimum number of broadcast stations, the extent
of the interference does not depend upon the content of the cable operators' programming." Id. at
643-44.
72 Id. at 661. The Court in Turner held that the must-carry obligations were subject to review
under "the intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral restrictions that impose an
incidental burden on speech." Id. at 662.
73 Barr v. Am. Ass'nofPol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2346 (2020) (describing the different
scrutiny standards applied to content-based and content-neutral laws).
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attacks on their character or official record.74 Strict scrutiny requires the
government to prove that it has a compelling interest to support the law in
question and that the law is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 75
In Tornillo, however, the Court never used the term "strict scrutiny." It
also never applied any balancing test that considered if Florida had a
"compelling" interest to support its right-of-reply statute and whether the
means to serve that interest were narrowly tailored. 76 The Court's failure to
apply strict scrutiny raises the question of whether the Court in Tornillo
intended to create "absolutist and unequivocal . . . protection of press
editorial sovereignty when it comes to thwarting governmental interference,"
rather than a right that might be overcome in some instances by certain
government interests. 7
This is problematic for courts when considering the constitutionality of
anti-deplatforming statutes because, assuming for the sake of argument that
such statutes are content-based, the Supreme Court in Tornillo provided no
guidance on how a strict scrutiny analysis might unspool.78 As described
earlier, the Court in Tornillo identified three primary problems with Florida's
right-of-reply statute: 1) the chilling effect and self-censorship that it might
cause; 2) the spatial and financial toll it might impose; and 3) the intrusion
on editorial autonomy and independence it would involve. 79 It is unclear
whether any one of these interests, standing alone, would be sufficient in
NetChoice, LLC v. Moody to rebut Florida's possibly compelling interest in
using anti-deplatforming statutes to provide its citizens with easy online
access to the unfiltered views of candidates running for office so that those
citizens might vote in a more well-informed manner.80
The Tornillo Court's concern with a chilling effect on the press simply
74 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163-64 (2015) (noting that "defining regulated
speech by particular subject matter" makes a law facially content-based and subject to strict
scrutiny).
7s Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011).
76 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (addressing the Tornillo Court's three reasons
for ruling the way it did).
?? Clay Calvert, Selecting Scrutiny in Compelled-Speech Cases Involving Non-Commercial
Expression: The Formulaic Landscape of a Strict Scrutiny World After Becerra and Janus, and a
First Amendment Interests-and-Values Alternative, 31 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.

L.J. 1, 41 (2020).
78 Judge Hinkle concluded that Florida's anti-deplatforming statute was content-based. See
NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, No. 4:21cv220-RH-MAF, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121951, at *29 (N.D.
Fla. June 30, 2021) (reasoning that the anti-deplatforming statute "applies to deplatforming a
candidate, not someone else; this is a content-based restriction").
79 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (addressing these three interests).
80 Such a possible compelling interest in support of Florida's anti-deplatforming statute taps
into philosopher-educator Alexander Meiklejohn's belief that the purpose of free speech "is the
voting of wise decisions" and that "the point of ultimate interest is not the words of the speakers,
but the minds of the hearers." See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT 25-26 (1948).
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is absent in NetChoice, LLC v. Moody. That is because Florida's antideplatforming statute applies to platforms regardless of the material they
host or post. Its application, in other words, cannot be dodged or avoided by
choosing not to host or post certain media or messages. Additionally, the fret
in Tornillo with a newspaper needing to pay the extra cost to add more
printed pages to accommodate a candidate's response is non-existent on the
internet; no new pages of newsprint must be paid for to accommodate the
speech of a candidate on a social media platform. Thus, with both the chilling
effect and the added cost interests that partly animated Tornillo rendered
nugatory, the right of editorial autonomy is the only remaining relevant First
Amendment interest from Tornillo's trio of concerns. As discussed earlier,
however, that interest arose from the Press Clause and thus may be irrelevant
when applied to non-journalistic entities such as social media platforms. 81
And, if that third interest is indeed stripped away, then all that remains of
Tornillo for social media platforms to contest anti-deplatforming statutes is
Tornillo's status as a right-not-to-speak case. 82 As noted earlier, the Court
recently suggested that laws that compel speech can be even more dangerous
than laws that restrict speech. 83 That logic certainly bolsters Tornillo's
usefulness in challenging anti-deplatforming statutes, but it does not
guarantee its ultimate effectiveness.
CONCLUSION

Jerome Barron, the attorney who argued on behalf of Pat Tornillo before
the Supreme Court in the case that bears the erstwhile candidate's name, 84
presciently predicted in 2008 that the same problems promulgated by private
ownership that plague access to legacy media outlets, such as newspapers
and television stations, may afflict the internet.85 The question now is how
much impact the print-centric Tornillo ruling that went against Barron's
client and his right-of-access theory will have on today's internet-based antideplatforming cases. 86
This Article addressed multiple problems that will hamper the use by

81 See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (addressing Tornillo's discussion of editorial
autonomy as being grounded in the Press Clause and limited to cases where the speaker plays an
institutional role as watchdog on government action).
82 See supra Section II.B (addressing Tornillo as a right-not-to-speak case).
83 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
84 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
85 See Jerome A. Barron, Access Reconsidered, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 826, 843 (2008)
(noting "the increasing dominance of the Internet by just a few search engines" and "the growing
importance and influence of Internet platforms owned and operated by the traditional media," and
contending that "[t]hese developments may be harbingers that the ownership and behavior patterns
of the dominant traditional media will be replicated on the Web").
86 See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (addressing Barron's theory regarding a First
Amendment-based right of access to the press).
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social media platforms of Tornillo to strike down anti-deplatforming statutes
such as the Florida mandate now under review by the Eleventh Circuit in
NetChoice, LLC v. Moody. Tornillo, in brief, does not neatly superimpose
onto NetChoice. Courts will have ample room to diminish Tornillo's impact
on anti-deplatforming laws and the cases that challenge them.
A final consideration is important here: whether Justice Anthony
87
Kennedy's dicta in Packingham v. North Carolina
will be used by courts
to weigh against Tornillo and in favor of anti-deplatforming statutes.
Kennedy's dicta, which Justice Samuel Alito derided as "undisciplined" 88
and "loose rhetoric," 89 suggested that cyberspace and "social media in
particular" were "the most important places" today for people "to celebrate
some views, to protest others, or simply to learn and inquire." 90 Kennedy
equated social media with physical spaces such as public streets and
sidewalks that are considered "quintessential forum[s] for the exercise of
First Amendment rights." 91
Moreover, Kennedy stressed in Packingham that individuals' access to
social media was of paramount importance. He opined that "[a] fundamental
principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to places
where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen
once more."92 This point is important because Florida's anti-deplatforming
law is a compelled-access mandate: Social media platforms cannot deny
access to candidates running for local or statewide office. 93 Put differently,
private entities must give candidates access.
Might not Packinghamthus militate in favor of states compelling access
in the face of Tornillo's pushback against it? It is neither that clear nor easy.
That is because, factually speaking, Packingham is a case about the
government denying access to social media platforms, rather than enforcing

87 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). In Packingham, the Court declared unconstitutional a state law that
made it a crime for registered sex offenders to access a commercial social networking website. See
id. at 1733. In striking down the statute, the Court reasoned that it "enacts a prohibition
unprecedented in the scope of First Amendment speech it burdens," noting that "[s]ocial media
allows users to gain access to information and communicate with one another about it on any
subject that might come to mind." Id. at 1737. In delivering the Court's opinion, Justice Kennedy
stressed the importance of people registered sex offenders included having access to social
media platforms, writing that "to foreclose access to social media altogether is to prevent the user
from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights." Id.
88 Id. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring).
89 Id. at 1743.
90 See id. at 1735 (majority opinion).
91 See id.
92 Id.
93 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.072(2) (West 2021) ("A social media platform may not willfully
deplatform a candidate for office who is known by the social media platform to be a candidate,
beginning on the date of qualification and ending on the date of the election or the date the candidate
ceases to be a candidate.").
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a law granting access to such digital venues. 94 Nonetheless, Kennedy's
observations linger, with Florida latching on to them in its opening brief with
the Eleventh Circuit in NetChoice, LLC v. Moody.95 Kennedy's views about
both the importance of social media platforms as forums for robust
discussion and the need for people to have access to them ultimately could
end up being the legal wildcard that shapes Tornillo's relevance.

94 In particular, Packingham centered on a North Carolina statute that made "it a felony for a
registered sex offender to gain access to a number of websites, including commonplace social
media websites like Facebook and Twitter." Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1733.
9s See Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 9, at 37 ("As the Supreme Court has observed,
'the vast democratic forums of the Internet, and social media in particular' have become 'the most
important places . . forthe exchange of views."' (quoting Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735, 1743)).

